盧陽正、黃旭男、方豪、牛海（2014）。中國大陸銀行對產業的放款群聚行為及其對銀行績效之影響。兩岸金融季刊，2(3)，55-78。
Lu, Yang-cheng, Hwang, Shiuh-nan, Fang, Hao, & Niu, Hai-zhou (2014). The Loan Herding of Chinese Banks for Industrial Lending and the Impact on Banking Performance在過去的文獻中，對群聚行為的研究主要大多針對股票市場投資與操作方面的研究，鮮少對銀行業借貸行為之集中趨勢著墨。Uchida and Nakagawa (2007)證實了日本銀行在 1975 到 2000 年信貸市場群聚效應確實存在，特別是出現在 20 世紀 80 年代中後期泡沫經濟時期，日本銀行顯現了週期性的群聚行為，其結果導致日本不良貸款的膨脹，導致了日本經濟的衰退。
（p. 56）
本研究首先延伸 Uchida and Nakagawa (2007)對日本銀行在放款市場的 LSV 及修正後 LSV 模型的做法，針對 2006 年美國次貸風暴、2008 年金融海嘯與 2009－2011 年金融海嘯後，中國銀行業監管者加強信用風險監管促使影子銀行之資產負債表外貸放架構逐步發展期間，探討中國股份制銀行及城市銀行對產業的放款是否存在顯著的群聚及非理性群聚行為。本研究分別分析在中國這兩類型銀行中持有風險加權資產比例愈高、不良貸款率愈高及政府持股比例愈高者，對企業放款是否存在顯著的非理性群聚行為。本文的實證結果發現在 2009 年和 2010 年期間，中國大陸股份制銀行與城市銀行對企業放款確實存在顯著的群聚行為。造成這種結果的原因可能是此期間為金融海嘯後全球經濟重整期間，且中國銀行業正面臨金融監理逐步加強管制與影子銀行繞道貸款架構創見下的激烈競爭之故。股份制銀行的放款群聚行為大小程度依序為製造業、批發和零售業、交通運輸、倉儲及郵政業與房地產業。同理，城市銀行對產業放款的群聚程度較大依序為製造業、水利、環境和公共設施管理業、批發和零售業與交通運輸、倉儲及郵政業。
Uchida, H. and R. Nakagawa (2007), “Herd Behavior in the Japanese Loan Market: Evidence from Bank Panel Data,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(4), 555-583.
許培基，葉銀華，謝偀杰（2000）。可轉換證券融資的模仿行為。證券市場發展，12(3)，43-79。
Shu, Pei-gi, Yeh, Yin-hua, and Shieh, Yin-jye
Brigham (1996), Stein (1992) 企業在資訊不對稱時企業融資的後門。
2000遠東紡織。
Stein (1992) backdoor hypothesis
p. 49
使用 Bhabra and Patel (1986) 以是後認定的方式，將樣本區分為模仿樣本與被模仿樣本。
Brigham (1996), Stein (1992) 企業在資訊不對稱時企業融資的後門。
2000遠東紡織。
Stein (1992) backdoor hypothesis
p. 49
使用 Bhabra and Patel (1986) 以是後認定的方式，將樣本區分為模仿樣本與被模仿樣本。
Herd behavior in equity market. Journal of Banking and Finance.
Herding can be construed as being either a rational or irrational form of investor behavior. According to Devenow and Welch (1996), the irrational view focuses on investor psychology where investors disregard their prior beliefs and follow other investors blindly. The rational view, on the other hand, focuses on the principal-agent problem in which managers mimic the action of others, completely ignoring their own private information to maintain their reputational capital in the market (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Rajan, 1994).
Devenow, A. and I. Welch (1996). Rational herding in financial economics. European Economic Review 40, 603-615.
（盧陽正、黃旭男、方豪、牛海，2014）
盧陽正、黃旭男、方豪、牛海（2014）。中國大陸銀行對產業的放款群聚行為及其對銀行績效之影響。兩岸金融季刊，2(3)，55-78。
劉清標，謝和原（2013）。臺灣存託憑證市場之從眾行為。商管科技季刊，14(3)，357-376。
邱臙珍（2013）。從眾行為傾向對流動性影響之研究。證券市場發展，25(4)，147-206。
羅明敏、江啟正（2013）。從行為財務學觀點探討臺灣地區證所稅事件對股票市場之影響。財金論文叢刊，18，55-83。
闕河士、方怡、王怡婷（2013）。指數期貨結算對股市從眾行為之影響。期貨與選擇權學刊，6(2)，1-21。
葉智丞、李春安（2012）。投資人情緒、從眾與非從眾行為關聯性之研究。證券市場發展，24(3)，141-182。
李春安、唐明曦（2011）。聲譽、訊息模糊與分析師從眾、離眾行為之研究。財務金融學刊，19(3)，81-120。
李建興、沈中華、顏碧霞（2010）。從眾贖回與非從眾贖回下基金投資人處分效果之探討：分量迴歸最小平方虛擬變數法。管理與系統，17(1)，1-26。
曾昭玲、周小玲（2010）。我國上市上櫃企業以短支長融資模式之從眾行為探討。臺灣管理學刊，10(2)，103-127。
羅進水、李春安（2009）。從眾與非從眾行為對市場報酬衝擊之研究。管理評論，28(3)，21-41。
王朝仕、余智生、李麗蘋（2012）。現金增資股票熱發行與績效表現之研究。臺灣企業績效學刊 ，6(1)，109-129。
王朝仕（2011）。投資人對現金增資股票的過度反應行為－魅力性觀點 。管理與系統，18(4)，633-662。
Bhabra, H.S. and A. Patel (1996). Convertible bond financing: Are some issuers mimickers? Financial Management, 25(4), 67-77.
Lowry, M. and G.W. Schwert (2002). IPO market cycles: Bubbles or Sequential learning? Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1171-1200.
盧陽正、黃旭男、方豪、牛海（2014）。中國大陸銀行對產業的放款群聚行為及其對銀行績效之影響。兩岸金融季刊，2(3)，55-78。
劉清標，謝和原（2013）。臺灣存託憑證市場之從眾行為。商管科技季刊，14(3)，357-376。
邱臙珍（2013）。從眾行為傾向對流動性影響之研究。證券市場發展，25(4)，147-206。
羅明敏、江啟正（2013）。從行為財務學觀點探討臺灣地區證所稅事件對股票市場之影響。財金論文叢刊，18，55-83。
闕河士、方怡、王怡婷（2013）。指數期貨結算對股市從眾行為之影響。期貨與選擇權學刊，6(2)，1-21。
葉智丞、李春安（2012）。投資人情緒、從眾與非從眾行為關聯性之研究。證券市場發展，24(3)，141-182。
李春安、唐明曦（2011）。聲譽、訊息模糊與分析師從眾、離眾行為之研究。財務金融學刊，19(3)，81-120。
李建興、沈中華、顏碧霞（2010）。從眾贖回與非從眾贖回下基金投資人處分效果之探討：分量迴歸最小平方虛擬變數法。管理與系統，17(1)，1-26。
曾昭玲、周小玲（2010）。我國上市上櫃企業以短支長融資模式之從眾行為探討。臺灣管理學刊，10(2)，103-127。
羅進水、李春安（2009）。從眾與非從眾行為對市場報酬衝擊之研究。管理評論，28(3)，21-41。
王朝仕、余智生、李麗蘋（2012）。現金增資股票熱發行與績效表現之研究。臺灣企業績效學刊 ，6(1)，109-129。
王朝仕（2011）。投資人對現金增資股票的過度反應行為－魅力性觀點 。管理與系統，18(4)，633-662。
Bhabra, H.S. and A. Patel (1996). Convertible bond financing: Are some issuers mimickers? Financial Management, 25(4), 67-77.
Lowry, M. and G.W. Schwert (2002). IPO market cycles: Bubbles or Sequential learning? Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1171-1200.
Lowry, M. and G.W. Schwert (2002). IPO market cycles: Bubbles or Sequential learning? Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1171-1200.
The phenomenon of "hot IPO markets" has been recognized for a long time in the financial community. It seems that periods of high and rising initial returns tend to be followed by spurts of IPOs, which are themselves followed by periods of lower initial returns.
Notably, neither the statistical reliability of these lead-lag relations nor the economics underlying these patterns have been examined. Consequently, we have little understanding of the factors that drive these fluctuations or of the implications of such phenomena for companies considering an IPO.
All these evidence implies the existence of decision herding among firms. This paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets. Some models can predict perfect herding, in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force. Such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities (negative externalities in bank runs; positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition), principal-agent problems (based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation), or informational learning (cascades). The paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research.
Devenow, Andrea
Welch, Ivo (1996). European Economic Review, 40 (3-5), 603-615.
決策行為可能存在從眾（herding）或群聚（clustering）現象，公司決策的從眾行為可能表現在發放政策、購票購回、初次新股上市（IPO）或新金增資（SEO）等。例如，公司可能基於迎合投資人與市場偏好的傾向，而發放股息（Baker and Wurgler, 2004），也可能是近似公司股票購回決策之模仿同業（Massa, Rehmana, and Vermaelen, 2007）。再如IPO公司 (Lowry and Schwert, 2002) 或SEO公司具有掌握股價趨勢（擇時）之能力 (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Baker and Wurgler, 2002)。以上都是因為經濟或市場趨勢改變，而導致企業的從眾決策行為。
We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms’ financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70% (Leary and Roberts, 2014).
Managers may also mimic other firms’ policies to influence their perceived relative quality in the labor market. In the model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), higher quality investment managers receive correlated signals about investment opportunities, while lower quality managers receive independent signals. Managers therefore mimic the investment choice of others in order to increase their perceived type. In this environment, herding is more important than making efficient investment choices because blame is shared in the event of a bad outcome.
在國內研究方面，也發現公司IPO決策（陳振遠、王朝仕，2008）或SEO決策（王朝仕、余智生、李麗蘋，2012）之從眾現象。劉清標與謝和原（2013）發現機構投資人在交易台灣存託憑證（TDR）時存在從眾現象。臺灣企業之股票購回行為盛行於空頭市場，存在明顯之從眾現象（李世欽等，2013b）。
Notably, neither the statistical reliability of these lead-lag relations nor the economics underlying these patterns have been examined. Consequently, we have little understanding of the factors that drive these fluctuations or of the implications of such phenomena for companies considering an IPO.
All these evidence implies the existence of decision herding among firms. This paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets. Some models can predict perfect herding, in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force. Such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities (negative externalities in bank runs; positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition), principal-agent problems (based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation), or informational learning (cascades). The paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research.
Devenow, Andrea
Welch, Ivo (1996). European Economic Review, 40 (3-5), 603-615.
決策行為可能存在從眾（herding）或群聚（clustering）現象，公司決策的從眾行為可能表現在發放政策、購票購回、初次新股上市（IPO）或新金增資（SEO）等。例如，公司可能基於迎合投資人與市場偏好的傾向，而發放股息（Baker and Wurgler, 2004），也可能是近似公司股票購回決策之模仿同業（Massa, Rehmana, and Vermaelen, 2007）。再如IPO公司 (Lowry and Schwert, 2002) 或SEO公司具有掌握股價趨勢（擇時）之能力 (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Baker and Wurgler, 2002)。以上都是因為經濟或市場趨勢改變，而導致企業的從眾決策行為。
We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms’ financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70% (Leary and Roberts, 2014).
Managers may also mimic other firms’ policies to influence their perceived relative quality in the labor market. In the model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), higher quality investment managers receive correlated signals about investment opportunities, while lower quality managers receive independent signals. Managers therefore mimic the investment choice of others in order to increase their perceived type. In this environment, herding is more important than making efficient investment choices because blame is shared in the event of a bad outcome.
在國內研究方面，也發現公司IPO決策（陳振遠、王朝仕，2008）或SEO決策（王朝仕、余智生、李麗蘋，2012）之從眾現象。劉清標與謝和原（2013）發現機構投資人在交易台灣存託憑證（TDR）時存在從眾現象。臺灣企業之股票購回行為盛行於空頭市場，存在明顯之從眾現象（李世欽等，2013b）。
In traditional Chinese culture, each number has special implications and significance to the Chinese (Brown, Chua, and Mitchell, 2002).
However, there are many Catholics, Christians and those who believe in science over superstition. It is reasonable to infer that firms led by the superstitious are persistent in choosing auspicious date to hold their shareholder meetings. On the other hand, firms who do not believe in Chinese superstitions should pick dates for holding their shareholder meeting in a more uniform or random method. They do not consult fortune tellers, nor check the Chinese lunar calendar, to review the meanings of calendar dates. Instead, they see the benefits when choosing the same dates for holding meetings. Hence, we have the following first hypothesis.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002). Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 1-32.
It is quite common in Taiwan that investors with minor stakes frequently annoyed the shareholder meetings by lengthy and massive questioning. After years of such experiences, now firms try to avoid the attendance of such investors, and more than 90% of firms hold the shareholder meeting in June.
However, there are many Catholics, Christians and those who believe in science over superstition. It is reasonable to infer that firms led by the superstitious are persistent in choosing auspicious date to hold their shareholder meetings. On the other hand, firms who do not believe in Chinese superstitions should pick dates for holding their shareholder meeting in a more uniform or random method. They do not consult fortune tellers, nor check the Chinese lunar calendar, to review the meanings of calendar dates. Instead, they see the benefits when choosing the same dates for holding meetings. Hence, we have the following first hypothesis.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002). Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 1-32.
It is quite common in Taiwan that investors with minor stakes frequently annoyed the shareholder meetings by lengthy and massive questioning. After years of such experiences, now firms try to avoid the attendance of such investors, and more than 90% of firms hold the shareholder meeting in June.
According to Article 170 of the Company Act, “The regular meeting of shareholders shall be convened within six months after close of each fiscal year.” Hence, a firm typically holds the shareholder meeting in May or June.
Some calendar dates are more frequently chosen by firms to hold their shareholders' meetings in addition to the intention of clustering in June to avoid the attendance of provocative minor-stake shareholder coming to too many different meetings and annoying the meeting procedures.
Some calendar dates are more frequently chosen by firms to hold their shareholders' meetings in addition to the intention of clustering in June to avoid the attendance of provocative minor-stake shareholder coming to too many different meetings and annoying the meeting procedures.
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